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ACTUAL MALICE IN THE INTERAMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
EDWARD CARTER*

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights decided four cases in recent years
that represent a positive step for freedom of expression in nations that belong to
the Organization of American States. In 2004 and again in 2008, the court
stopped short of adopting a standard that would require proof of actual malice in
criminal defamation cases brought by public officials. In 2009, however, the court
seemed to adopt the actual malice rule without calling it that. The court’s
progress toward actual malice is chronicled in this article. The article concludes
that the court’s decision not to explicitly use the phrase “actual malice” may be a
positive development for freedom of expression in the Americas.
Since its inception in 1979, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
based in San José, Costa Rica, has moved to protect freedom of expression under
the American Convention on Human Rights. Article 13 of that convention,
which has been ratified by twenty-five of the thirty-four members of the
Organization of American States,1 protects a range of activities under the

Associate Professor of Communications, Brigham Young University.
Notably, Canada has not signed or ratified the treaty, which is also called the “Pact of
San José,” and the United States has signed but not ratified it. See General Information of the
Treaty: B-32, at
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm.
OAS member states that have ratified the agreement are Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname,
Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Id. OAS member states besides Canada and the
United States that have not ratified the treaty are Antigua y Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Guyana,
St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent & Grenadines. Id.
*

1

heading of “freedom of thought and expression.”2 Most of the Inter-American
Court’s interpretations of Article 13 have come during the last dozen years, and
in that time the court has held that Chile could not ban the Martin Scorsese film
The Last Temptation of Christ;3 Peru could not revoke citizenship and shareholding
control from a broadcaster who criticized the Peruvian Intelligence Services for
torture, abuse and corruption;4 Chile could not censor copies of a former military

2 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 1.1, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]. Article 13 states:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This
right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art,
or through any other medium of one’s choice.
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall
not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of
liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to
ensure:
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public
health or morals.
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or
means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint,
radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of
information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and
circulation of ideas and opinions.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public
entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of
regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence.
5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or
religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other
similar action against any person or group of persons on any grounds including
those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as
offenses punishable by law.
Id. (English translation reproduced here is available at the Web site of the Organization of
American States,
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.htm) (last
visited Dec. 4, 2012).
3 Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile, 2001 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 73 (Feb. 5, 2001).
4 Case of Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 74 (Feb. 6, 2001).

officer’s book that was critical of the Chilean Navy;5 Chile had to provide
government-held information about a deforestation project;6 Venezuela could
not criminally convict a former brigadier general who appeared on television to
criticize the military for using flamethrowers as punishment against its own
soldiers;7 Colombia violated the free-speech rights of an outspoken senator by
failing to protect him from extrajudicial execution;8 Brazil had to provide
government-held information about the military’s involvement in the detention,
torture and disappearance of seventy people in the 1970s;9 and Argentina could
not hold magazine journalists liable for privacy invasion after they wrote about
an illegitimate child of former President Carlos Saúl Menem.10
In the area of criminal defamation, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has moved cautiously toward an actual malice standard for statements
about public officials. In separate cases in 2004, the court held that Costa Rica
and Paraguay, respectively, should reverse criminal libel convictions and reform
criminal libel statutes.11 Although protective of freedom of expression, these

5

Case of Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 135 (Nov. 22,

6

Case of Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 151 (Sept. 19,

7

Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 207 (Nov. 20,

2005).
2006).
2009).
Case of Manuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia, 2010 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 213
(May 26, 2010).
9 Case of Gomes-Lund et al. (Guerrilha do Araguaia) v. Brazil, 2010 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 219 (Nov. 24, 2010).
10 Case of Fonteveccia and D’Amico v. Argentina, 2011 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.
238 (Nov. 29, 2011).
11 Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 107 (July 2, 2004);
Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 111 (Aug. 31, 2004).
8

decisions were nevertheless criticized for failing to articulate a standard by
which to measure the appropriateness of a criminal punishment for
defamation.12 Scholars suggested, for example, that the Inter-American Court
could adopt a U.S.-style actual malice standard.13 Other suggestions included a
standard of gross negligence; another that would require a showing of lack of
good faith; and a third standard that would have measured whether the message
was communicated with specific intent to cause harm.14
In two recent criminal libel cases,15 the Inter-American Court came closer
to embracing the actual malice standard famously articulated by the Supreme
Court of the United States for civil defamation in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan16
and for criminal defamation in Garrison v. Louisiana.17 However, the InterAmerican Court, at least in its original Spanish-language opinions in those two
cases, does not explicitly use the phrase “actual malice,” nor does the court cite
the Sullivan opinion. After reviewing the state of understanding and acceptance
of the actual malice standard internationally, this article discusses the InterAmerican Court’s slow march toward adopting actual malice as a requirement in
criminal defamation prosecutions. The article then discusses the merits of the
Court’s seeming reluctance to tie itself too closely to the United States or the
See Jo M. Pasqualucci, Criminal Defamation and the Evolution of the Doctrine of Freedom of
Expression in International Law: Comparative Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 379, 401-03 (2006).
13 See id. at 402-03 (citations omitted).
14 See id.
15 Kimel v. Argentina, 2008 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 177 (May 2, 2008); Donoso v.
Panama, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 193 (Jan. 27, 2009).
16 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
12

Sullivan opinion, even while essentially applying the legal standard dictated by
the Supreme Court in that case. The article concludes the Inter-American Court
has achieved the best of both worlds by essentially adopting the actual malice
standard without providing the basis for criticism that could come with an
explicit citation to the Supreme Court’s Sullivan opinion.

GLOBAL REACTIONS TO ACTUAL MALICE
The late New York Times Supreme Court reporter Anthony Lewis wrote
that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sullivan was “stunning” and “written in the
grand style, reordering a whole area of the law as few modern Supreme Court
opinions do — or can, really.”18 In its March 9, 1964, opinion by Justice William
J. Brennan, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibited states
from allowing civil liability for defamation unless plaintiffs could prove
statements about public officials were made with knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth.19 The rule was later extended to public figures20 and to
criminal defamation statutes.21 Although stopping short of granting absolute
immunity for statements about public officials, as three justices urged,22
Brennan’s majority opinion was nonetheless revolutionary because it imposed a

ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW 154-55 (1991).
376 U.S. at 279-80.
20 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
21 Garrison, 379 U.S. 64.
22 See 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring, joined by Douglas, J.); 376 U.S. at 298
(Goldberg, J., concurring in result, joined by Douglas, J.).
18
19

heavy burden on defamation plaintiffs to prove that erroneous statements were
made with a high degree of fault, not just negligently or innocently.23
Critical to the Sullivan opinion were the Court’s background passages
about the role of free expression in society. Justice Brennan cited past Supreme
Court opinions to make the point that freedom of speech guarantees
accountability of government leaders and allows citizens to participate in
democratic decision-making.24 Further, the Court held, the United States
committed itself to allowing a broad range of voices into the marketplace of ideas
and letting the people, rather than the government, decide what was true and
valuable.25
The Court also alluded to the “safety valve” and self-fulfillment, or
autonomy, rationales for freedom of expression.26 The safety valve theory holds
that allowing citizens to let off stream through speech can forestall violence.27

See LEWIS, supra note 18, at 156.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (citations omitted). Both before and after Sullivan, scholars
have elaborated on the value of free speech to facilitate self-governance and to keep government
officials in check. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (1977) (“Interestingly, the most influential free-speech theorists of the
eighteenth century — those who drafted the First Amendment and their mentors — placed great
emphasis on the role free expression can play in guarding against breaches of trust by public
officials.”); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 256
(1961) (“[T]he First Amendment, as seen in its constitutional setting, forbids Congress to abridge
the freedom of a citizen’s speech, press, peaceable assembly, or petition, whenever those activities
are utilized for the governing of the nation.”).
25 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (quoting Judge Learned Hand, United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes memorably evoked
the marketplace of ideas rationale for free speech in the early twentieth century. See Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market.”).
26 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269-70.
27 See THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
23
24

The self-fulfillment explanation values free speech not for its content or
consequence but merely for its importance to human beings as a natural or
fundamental right.28 As a result of all this, Brennan wrote, the Court considered
the case “against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”29
If the actual malice rule was revolutionary for the United States, it
generally has been difficult to accept for judges and legislators in most countries
around the world. Harvard Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz said in 1988
that “[t]he United States is the only country in the world whose law requires
‘actual malice’ before a public person can win a libel suit.”30 One prominent
international media law scholar, Kyu Ho Youm, noted that the Canadian
Supreme Court has said actual malice is a purely American phenomenon,31 and
the Korean Supreme Court also rejected the actual malice standard in favor of
reputational interests.32 Australia and the United Kingdom explicitly declined to

See David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
29 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
30 ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, TAKING LIBERTIES 62 (1988) (cited in Kyu Ho Youm, Suing
American Media in Foreign Courts: Doing an End-Run Around U.S. Libel Law?, 16 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L. J. 235, 259 n.197 (1994)).
31 See The 2010 JIMEL Colloquium: Recent Developments in International Defamation Law, 3
J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 289, 305 (2010-11) (comments of Kyu Ho Youm).
32 See Kyu Ho Youm, Freedom of Expression and the Law: Rights and Responsibilities in South
Korea, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 123, 137 (2002).
28

adopt actual malice and, instead, chose other methods for protecting freedom of
expression.33
Still, in 2004, Youm concluded that Argentina, Bosnia, Hungary, Pakistan,
the Philippines and Taiwan had essentially adopted actual malice while India
had applied a close variation of the doctrine.34 The Supreme Court of Japan in
1986 discussed the importance of striking a balance between reputation and
freedom of expression; although the court did not adopt the actual malice rule,
one concurring justice did discuss the rule favorably.35 Although many foreign
courts stopped short of adopting actual malice, Youm nonetheless concluded
that the Sullivan opinion had helped forge a broad international consensus about
the importance of political expression and the role of the “citizen-critic.”36 He
also suggested that the rule might be more well-received internationally if it
were easier to understand and explain.37
In the late 1990s, observers began encouraging the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights38 to follow the example of the European Court of Human
33 See Kyu Ho Youm, New York Times v. Sullivan: Impact on Freedom of the Press Abroad,
COMM. LAW. 14-16 (2004).
34 Id. at 12-14. For additional discussion of these countries’ approaches, see Kyu Ho Youm,
“Actual Malice” in U.S. Defamation Law: The Minority of One Doctrine in the World?, 4 J. INT’L MEDIA
& ENT. L. 1 (2011-12).
35 See Youm, supra note 33, at 16.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 The court, which is based in San José, Costa Rica, describes itself as “an autonomous
judicial institution of the Organization of American States established in 1979, and whose
objective is the application and interpretation of the American Convention on Human Rights and
other treaties concerning this same matter.” Welcome, Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.cfm?&CFID=2125857&CFTOKEN=19919647. Individuals may
not directly file a petition or appeal with the Inter-American Court. Instead, only OAS member
states that are parties to the American Convention and have accepted the court’s contentious

Rights by staking out a more aggressive position on freedom of expression issues
and granting less deference to national governments.39 The European Court may
not have explicitly endorsed the actual malice test from U.S. jurisprudence,40 but
the court in the 1986 Lingens v. Austria case held that Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights prevented a state from imposing defamation
liability for value judgments about a public official without proof of falsity.41
One scholar concluded that the European Court generally applied a “good faith”
or “professional practice fault standard” that was commendable but not as
protective of freedom of speech as the actual malice standard.42
The actual malice rule is not the only American legal concept which
foreign courts have viewed somewhat skeptically. Citing foreign law in
constitutional interpretation has generated vigorous debate and disagreement in
national constitutional courts around the world, including in the U.S. Supreme

jurisdiction, as well as the Inter-American Commission, may refer cases to the Inter-American
Court. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Petition and Case System,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/pdf/HowTo.pdf.
39 See Edward J. Pauw & Ari Chaim Shapiro, Defamation, the Free Press, and Latin America:
A Roadmap for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Emerging Democracies, 30 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 203, 210-11 (1998). For a review of the court’s early freedom of expression
jurisprudence, see Claudio Grossman, Freedom of Expression in the Inter-American System for the
Protection of Human Rights, 25 NOVA L. REV. 411 (2001).
40 The 2010 JIMEL Colloquium, supra note 31, at 303-07 (comments of Kyu Ho Youm)
(“Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights has sometimes ruled more liberally in free press
cases than the U.S. Supreme Court, although it has yet to embrace ‘actual malice’ as such.”).
41 Case of Lingens v. Austria, Application No. 9815/82, July 8, 1986, available at
http://portal.uclm.es/descargas/idp_docs/jurisprudencia/lingens%20eng%20%20libertad%20de%20expresion.%20libertaed%20de%20opinion%20y%20de%20informacion.%2
0libertad%20de%20prensa%20y%20.pdf.
42 Dan Kozlowski, “For the Protection of the Reputation or Rights of Others”: The European
Court of Human Rights’ Interpretation of the Defamation Exception in Article 10(2), 11 COMM. L. &
POL’Y 133, 174-75 (2006).

Court.43 Reliance on foreign law has been criticized for lacking democratic
legitimacy since a foreign court or legislature is not accountable or otherwise
responsive to citizens of another nation.44 Unlike some political, cultural and
even legal concepts (such as bankruptcy and commercial law), constitutional law
in particular may not lend itself to cross-border transfer because of its close
identification with national sovereignty, legitimacy and independence.45 Some
nations may be motivated by financial or political incentives to explicitly adopt
legal concepts from the United States, but for other countries, “[A]voiding
American influence just because it is American often appears to be a driving
force.”46 The balance is particularly complicated for the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights because the United States, though obviously a singular regional
power, has not ratified the American Convention nor subjected itself to the
contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court.47
Some nations – South Africa is one – have explicitly authorized in their
constitutions the reliance on foreign law in constitutional interpretation.48 But
Justice Antonin Scalia, among others, argues that reliance on foreign law
inherently leads to overreaching and manipulation, since a constitutional court

Although a lengthy discussion is beyond the scope of this article, on this topic see
generally Jacob Foster, The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: Lessons from South
Africa, 45 UNIV. OF SAN FRAN. L. REV. 79 (2010).
44 See id. at 119.
45 See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation, in
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253-68 (Joseph S. Nye & John D. Donahue eds., 2000);
Frederick Schauer, On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 37 CONN. L. REV. 907, 912 (2005).
46 Schauer, The Politics, supra note 45, at 260.
47 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
48 See Foster, supra note 43, at 119.
43

would rely on its own relevant precedents if they existed.49 Even the
Constitutional Court of South Africa pointed to the U.S. actual malice standard
as an example of a foreign legal concept that was outside the global mainstream
and, therefore, of limited relevance in South African defamation cases.50
Scholars, too, note the actual malice rule must be considered extreme in the
comparative global context, yet the rule is well-known around the world because
of the Sullivan-based First Amendment evangelizing of U.S. journalists.51
British libel law has attracted much criticism due to its pro-plaintiff
nature, expansive jurisdiction leading to libel tourism and high costs for
defendants.52 While Great Britain is making efforts to reform its libel law and
address these concerns, the prospect of adoption of an actual malice standard for
statements about public officials and public figures has been met with a
resounding thud.53 The United Nations Human Rights Committee suggested
Britain should consider adopting the actual malice doctrine, but the suggestion
may have been counterproductive in some quarters by causing a backlash
against foreign, particularly American, interference.54 Instead, the British
government seems to be focusing its efforts on reform elsewhere, with the phone

See id. at 85-86.
See id. at 113 (citing Khumalo v. Holomisa, 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC), at para. 40 (S. Afr.)
(stating that New York Times v. Sullivan “represents the high-water mark of foreign jurisprudence
protecting the freedom of speech and many jurisdictions have declined to follow it.”)).
51 See Schauer, The Politics, supra note 45, at 258 n.23.
52 See, e.g., Stephen Bates, Libel Capital No More? Reforming British Defamation Law, 34
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 233, 233-34 (2012).
53 See id. at 241-42 (citing criticisms by a member of the House of Lords and by a media
lawyer, who called Sullivan “a defamer’s charter.”).
54 See id. at 248.
49
50

hacking scandal — resulting in the closing of Rupert Murdoch’s News of the
World and the 2012 Leveson Report — drawing attention to limiting invasions of
privacy by the press rather than expanding speech protections in case of alleged
defamation.55
Developments in the inter-American human rights system have
demonstrated that the actual malice formulation is not easily understood.
Argentine legislators, for example, proposed in 1999 to include an actual malice
requirement in their country’s statutory defamation law, but the proposed
statute equated actual malice with “criminal intent or gross fault and
negligence.”56 However, at another point in the draft legislation, which was
undertaken in part to settle a complaint of human-rights violation brought to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Washington, D.C.,57 the
Argentine legislators gave a definition of actual malice that more closely
resembles the one adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court. The legislation would
have required a defamation proponent to prove not only that a false statement
55 See The Leveson Inquiry, An Inquiry Into the Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press, Nov.
29, 2012, available at
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc07/0780/0780.asp.
56 Organization of the American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights 1999 (Annex), 1999 IACHR 79 (Apr. 13, 2000).
57 The commission is made up of seven members and was established in 1959. Its
function is to promote defense of human rights by investigating claims of abuses, making reports
and carrying out initiatives, visiting OAS countries and analyzing the validity of individual
petitions seeking relief from human rights abuses. Individuals may make a complaint of human
rights abuses to the commission, but individuals may not directly access the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights; only the commission and nations that have ratified the American
Convention and submitted themselves to the court’s jurisdiction may bring a matter before the
Inter-American Court. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Petition and Case
System, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/pdf/HowTo.pdf. As a functional matter, the
commission is the gatekeeper for the cases that are heard by the Inter-American Court.

was made but that it was made “despite the fact that the author knew it was
untrue or acted in rash disregard for the truth.”58
The Inter-American Commission noted that Argentina’s Supreme Court
held in Vago v. Ediciones La Urraca S.A. that proof of damages in a defamation
case required “those that deem themselves affected by false or inaccurate
information [to] prove that the person who produced said information acted
with malice.”59 Although this has been described as Argentina’s judicial
adoption of the actual malice standard,60 it could also be interpreted to refer to
common-law malice, ill will or hatred that the U.S. Supreme Court has
specifically said is not the same thing as actual malice.61 Still, scholarly observers
consider that Argentina is among the foremost nations to adopt a U.S.-style
actual malice doctrine for defamation.62
It would not be appropriate to harshly criticize those in OAS member
states and the inter-American human rights system who confuse malice and
actual malice, given that the U.S. Supreme Court itself recognized the possibility
OAS, Annual Report, supra note 56.
Organization of the American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights 1999 (Chapter II: Assessment of the Situation of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere),
1999 IACHR 15 (1999) (citation omitted).
60 Id. (stating that Argentina had in this case enshrined the actual malice standard in its
defamation law). Provincial courts following the Argentina Supreme Court’s lead later adopted
the actual malice test. See Organization of the American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights 2004 (Chapter II: The Situation of Freedom of Expression in the
Hemisphere), ¶ 36, 2004 IACHR 15 (2004).
61 See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) (“Actual malice
under the New York Times standard should not be confused with the concept of malice as an evil
intent or a motive arising from spite or ill will.”).
62 See, e.g., Kyu Ho Youm, Liberalizing British Defamation Law: A Case of Importing the First
Amendment?, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 415, 417-18 (2008); Susana N. Vittadini Andrés, U.S. Actual
Malice Doctrine in Argentine Constitutional Law, TAMKANG J. OF INT’L AFFAIRS,
http://www2.tku.edu.tw/~ti/Journal/9-1/912.pdf.
58
59

for confusion and suggested U.S. judges not use the term “actual malice” in jury
instructions but rather use the phrase “publication of a statement with
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or falsity.”63 In fact, the
author of the constitutional actual malice test on the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice
Brennan, regretted choosing that term in his later years.64 In his majority opinion
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Brennan suggested the phrase came from state
court decisions, including prominently the 1908 Kansas Supreme Court decision
of Coleman v. MacLennan.65 In that Kansas case, the term “actual malice” seemed
to refer to proven or established malice, as opposed to mere inferred malice. 66
The Kansas court had used another phrase — good faith — that more aptly
described the concept that a defamation plaintiff had to prove lack of sufficient
efforts to discover the truth on the part of the defendant.67
After its creation by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in
1997, the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression68 repeatedly urged OAS

Masson, 501 U.S. at 511 (calling the term actual malice “an unfortunate one”).
See SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 227 (2010).
65 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (citing Coleman v.
MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908)).
66 98 P. at 286.
67 Id. (“According to the greater number of authorities, the occasion giving rise to
conditional privilege does not justify statements which are untrue in fact, although made in good
faith, without malice and under the honest belief that they are true. A minority allows the
privilege under such circumstances.”).
68 This office is based in Washington, D.C., and has approximately a half-dozen staff
attorneys who advise the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights about cases; prepare
reports; carry out promotional and educational activities on the right to freedom of expression;
conduct visits to OAS member states; and promote the adoption of legislative, judicial and
administrative measures that favor freedom of expression. See Mandate of the Office of the
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/mandate/. One scholar wrote, “In creating the Office
of Special Rapporteur, the Commission’s main objective was to reinforce and protect the
63
64

member states to adopt an actual malice standard in their defamation law. In
1999, for example, the Special Rapporteur told member states in the
commission’s annual report that “the acceptance of the doctrine of ‘actual malice’
and the resulting amendment of libel and slander laws” was “one practical
consequence” of balancing the protection of the rights of honor and reputation of
private persons with the free and open discussion necessary with regard to the
activities of public officials engaged in the public’s business.69 The Special
Rapporteur suggested that lack of an actual malice standard was, at least in some
ways, more harmful to freedom of speech than the routine murder of journalists
in certain Latin American countries.70 The Special Rapporteur has stressed that
merely allowing truth as a defense is not sufficient; OAS member states have
been encouraged to put the burden of proving falsity, and knowledge of falsity,
on the plaintiff.71
In 2000, the Special Rapporteur drafted, and the Inter-American
Commission adopted, a document titled “Declaration of Principles on Freedom

observance, respect, and development of freedom of expression in the Americas, especially given
the fundamental role that right plays in building and strengthening the democratic system of
government and in protecting other rights.” Santiago A. Canton, The Role of the OAS Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression in Promoting Democracy in the Americas, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV.
307, 310 (2002).
69 Organization of the American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights 1999 (Chapter III: Final Thoughts and Recommendations), 1999 IACHR 48 (1999).
70 Id. The Special Rapporteur also urged nations to repeal their desacato laws, which
punish contempt, insult, offense or threat against a public official in the performance of official
responsibilities. Id.
71 Organization of the American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights 1999 (Chapter II: Assessment of the Situation of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere),
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of Expression.”72 Its Principle 10 stated that “a public official, a public person or
a private person who has voluntarily become involved in matters of public
interest” should never be allowed to pursue criminal defamation charges.73
Further, the declaration stated that public officials and public figures, plus
private figures involved in matters of public interest, should prevail on civil
defamation claims only after proving “that in disseminating the news, the social
communicator had the specific intent to inflict harm, was fully aware that false
news was disseminated, or acted with gross negligence in efforts to determine
the truth or falsity of such news.”74
The Special Rapporteur did not say if this protection should be afforded
only to journalists, nor did the declaration define “social communicators.” But
since Principle 10 referred to “news,” it could be inferred that only journalists, or
those purveying newsworthy information, might enjoy the protection of the
actual malice-like doctrine being proposed. The Special Rapporteur also did not
explain why the declaration would impose liability on a showing of gross
negligence rather than recklessness, or whether in fact any difference between
the two was intended.
In commentary about the declaration’s Principle 10, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights asserted that the declaration advocated an actual

72 Organization of the American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights 2000 (Chapter II: Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression), 2000 IACHR 11
(2000).
73 Id. at ¶ 10 (“Principles”).
74 Id.

malice standard, though the manner in which the commission described actual
malice might seem odd to U.S. lawyers and judges accustomed to the New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan formulation. The commission described actual malice as a
“legal doctrine used to protect the honor of public officials or public figures,”75
when in reality actual malice is designed to protect commentators about public
officials and public figures from being held liable for defamation. Instead of the
“gross negligence” term used by the Special Rapporteur, the commission used
the phrase “manifest negligence,” and later equated actual malice with malice.76
The possibility exists that these differences were not intended to be significant,
and perhaps they could be ascribed to document translation. But language
matters, particularly in the case of actual malice.

RELUCTANCE ABOUT ACTUAL MALICE
It was against a backdrop of some confusion and uncertainty, but also
some apparent willingness to accept the framework behind the actual malice
standard, that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights took up two cases in
2004 that gave the Court the opportunity to consider the role the actual malice
doctrine might play in protecting speech freedom. The court ultimately stopped
short of applying the actual malice doctrine even while valuing and protecting
the right to freedom of speech.
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Id. at ¶ 46 (“Interpretation”).
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Herrera Case
In 1995, Costa Rican journalist Mauricio Herrera published a series of
articles in the daily newspaper La Nación that discussed the involvement of a
Costa Rican diplomat, Félix Przedborski, in the “biggest financial, political and
military scandal in the history” of Belgium.77 The Belgian press already had
accused Przedborski and others of receiving hidden commissions in the sale of
Italian military helicopters to Belgium.78 Press accounts in several Belgian
publications linked the scandal to the assassination of André Cools, Belgian
budget minister and vice prime minister.79 Herrera, an investigative and
political reporter at La Nación for twelve years, determined that the accusations
made in the Belgian press were newsworthy to Costa Rican readers because
Przedborski served as an honorary Costa Rican ambassador at the International
Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria.
Herrera undertook an investigation to verify the accusations made against
Przedborski. He consulted numerous sources familiar with the situation and
made what he called “exhaustive attempts,” which were ultimately unsuccessful,

Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 107, at ¶ 66.a (July 2,
2004), (“Testimony of Mauricio Herrera Ulloa, alleged victim in the case”). Except where
otherwise noted, citations are to the Inter-American Court’s official English translation of the
opinion, although the opinion was first officially published by the court in Spanish. Because page
numbers differ between the English and Spanish versions, paragraph citations — which do not
differ in the English and Spanish versions — are used.
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to reach Przedborski.80 Herrera interviewed various sources in the Costa Rican
government, including at the Ministry of Foreign Relations, who confirmed they
were aware of the published accusations against Przedborski.81 The Costa Rican
ambassador to Belgium had filed an official report expressing worry about the
numerous appearances of Przedborski in the Belgian press coverage of the
scandal.82 The government of Costa Rica eventually undertook a review of its
foreign service and decided to revoke the titles of honorary diplomats, including
Przedborski.83 In his investigation, Herrera did not come across any information
to contradict the accusations against Przedborski.
After Herrera’s first article about Przedborski was published in May 1995,
a lawyer for Przedborski appeared at La Nación but declined to answer any
questions for publication.84 Another lawyer for Przedborski refused to answer
written questions submitted by Herrera.85 But Przedborski himself authored an
article published by La Nación to explain his version of events.86 Nevertheless,
after the second round of articles in December 1995, Przedborski initiated both
civil and criminal actions against Herrera and La Nación in the Costa Rican
courts.
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Przedborski alleged that, in three articles published in May 1995 and one
article published in December 1995, Herrera had committed the crimes defined
by Costa Rica’s Penal Code as defamation,87 slander88 and “publication of
offenses.”89 However, the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José
acquitted Herrera in 1998 because the court found he lacked the requisite degree
of fault under Penal Code sections defining “crimes against honor.”90 But
approximately one year later, the Supreme Court of Costa Rica reversed the
lower court judgment after concluding the court erred in its determination that
Herrera lacked knowledge and intent.91
Herrera was convicted in 1999 in the Criminal Court of the First Judicial
Circuit of San José, which concluded at that point that he published the articles
with knowledge of their offensive character and with intent to dishonor and
affect the reputation of Przedborski.92 For the criminal conviction, the court
imposed a small fine. The court also ordered Herrera and La Nación to publish
an explanation of the judgment with the same prominent placement in the
87 Código penal de Costa Rica, Titulo II, Artículo 146 (1970). Article 146 punishes
defamation by establishing a fine for “dishonoring another person or publishing information
capable of affecting another person’s reputation.” (Spanish-English translations, unless indicated
otherwise, are by the author).
88 Código penal de Costa Rica, Titulo II, Artículo 147 (1970). Article 147 punishes slander
by establishing a fine approximately two-and-one-half times greater than the fine for defamation
for those who “falsely attribute to another person the commission of a criminal act.”
89 Código penal de Costa Rica, Titulo II, Artículo 152 (1970). Article 152 punishes those
who publish or reproduce a third party’s statements dishonoring another person, including
defamation and slander, as if the publisher or reproducer were the original author of speaker of
the statements.
90 Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 107, at ¶ 95.q (July 2,
2004).
91 Id. at ¶ 95.s.
92 Id. at ¶ 95.t.

newspaper as had been given the articles about Przedborski. The court also
imposed a larger civil fine on La Nación and Herrera for the “moral damage”
caused as a result of the articles about Przedborski.93 The court ordered the
newspaper to remove the links from its Web edition to copies of the articles
about Przedborski and create instead a link to the court’s judgment. The
Supreme Court of Costa Rica affirmed the sentence in 2001.
On March 1, 2001, Herrera was listed in Costa Rica’s Registro Judicial de
Delincuentes, an official government list of convicted persons, as required by
Costa Rican law.94 That same day, attorneys for the newspaper and reporter
presented a petition for reprieve to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. The commission recommended that Costa Rica de-list Herrera as a
convict and withhold the judgment requiring La Nación to publish on its web
edition a link to the court’s judgment.95 Costa Rica declined to follow the
commission’s recommendation. The commission then submitted the case to the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Herrera and his wife, Laura Mariela González Picado, testified before the
Inter-American Court that the conviction had caused them extreme
psychological suffering.96 Herrera said he was traumatized by the criminal
prosecution and that his career was badly damaged, given that the sources he
tried to interview identified him as the “convicted journalist” and were reluctant
Id. at ¶ 95.u.
Id. at ¶ 95.dd.
95 Id. at ¶ 11.
96 See id. at ¶¶ 61-66.a.
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to share information with him.97 Finally, Herrera told the human rights tribunal
that one of the most pernicious effects of the conviction was that he found
himself practicing self-censorship in that he feared to publish articles that might
result in another criminal complaint.98
In 2004, the Inter-American Court concluded that the criminal and civil
penalties Costa Rica levied against Herrera violated his rights under Article 13 of
the American Convention on Human Rights. The court stated: “Without
effective freedom of expression, exercised in all its forms, democracy is
enervated, pluralism and tolerance start to deteriorate, the mechanisms for
control and complaint by the individual become ineffectual and, above all, a
fertile ground is created for authoritarian systems to take root in society.”99
While recognizing that freedom of expression is not absolute, the court stated
that restrictions on speech such as that of Herrera must meet three requirements:
(1) the restrictions must be clearly spelled out in the law; (2) the restrictions must
be designed to protect the rights and reputations of others, national security,
public order, or public health and morals; and (3) the restrictions must be
necessary in a democratic society.100
The court stopped short of adopting an actual malice standard —
although lawyers for Herrera and the newspaper had urged on the court the U.S.
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Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on that issue101 — but nevertheless applied a test
that produced a similar result. First, the court spent some time delineating the
free speech interests at stake. The court stated that freedom of expression
includes not only the right to share a point of view but also the right to receive
opinions, news and information from others.102 The court stated that the right to
receive speech was just as important for an individual as the right to express
one’s own message.103 As had the U.S. Supreme Court in Sullivan, the InterAmerican Court also discussed the value of free speech in ensuring democratic
participation and guaranteeing government officials’ accountability, as well as
the idea that free speech was a fundamental individual right.104
The court then concluded that the criminal punishment imposed on
Herrera violated the American Convention because it was not necessary in a
democratic society. Specifically, the court said that the information relayed by
Herrera about Przedborski was of legitimate public interest.105 The court did not
use the term “actual malice,” but it did speak in language that evoked that
concept:

Those individuals who have an influence on matters of public interest
have laid themselves open voluntarily to a more intense public scrutiny

See id. at ¶¶ 66.c, 66.e, 102.5.
Id. at ¶ 110.
103 Id.
104 Id. at ¶¶ 112, 113, 115, 125-129.
105 Id. at ¶ 131.
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and, consequently, in this domain, they are subject to a higher risk of
being criticized, because their activities go beyond the private sphere and
belong to the realm of public debate.106

Canese Case
Ricardo Canese is a Paraguayan industrial engineer who lived in exile in
Holland from 1977 to 1984 because of his opposition to the military dictatorship
of former Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner.107 Canese began in about
1978 to investigate and write about the functioning of the Itaipú dam and
hydroelectric station, one of the world’s largest hydroelectric plants and a joint
Brazilian-Paraguayan project located on the Paraná River.108 In 1990 and 1991,
Canese presented allegations to the Paraguayan government that CONEMPA, a
consortium of Paraguayan companies holding a monopoly on all Paraguayan
work at Itaipú, had engaged in tax evasion and other improper activities.109
In 1991, Canese was elected as a representative of the minor political party
Asunción para Todos to a municipal post, and in 1993, the same party nominated
him to run for president of the republic.110 The 1993 presidential elections came
during a transition period for Paraguay, given that the country had been
governed by the Stroessner dictatorship from 1954 to 1989. Another presidential
106
107
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candidate, Juan Carlos Wasmosy of the Partido Colorado, had been president of
CONEMPA. During the campaign, in August 1992, Canese was interviewed by
journalists from two Paraguayan publications, Noticias and ABC Color, about
Wasmosy.
In August 1992, Noticias published an article quoting Canese as having
said that “Wasmosy amassed his fortune thanks to Stroessner” and that
“Wasmosy . . . passed from bankruptcy to the most spectacular wealth, thanks to
support from the dictator’s family, which allowed him to assume his
chairmanship of CONEMPA.”111 The same day, ABC Color published an article
quoting Canese as having said that “Wasmosy was the Stroessner family’s front
man in CONEMPA, and the company transferred substantial dividends to the
dictator.”112 Wasmosy was elected president of Paraguay in 1993.
In October 1992, three former directors of CONEMPA, Ramón Jiménez
Gaona, Oscar Aranda and Hermann Baumann, initiated a criminal complaint
against Canese for defamation113 and desacato, or insult.114 Although none of the
three CONEMPA directors was named in the Noticias and ABC Color articles, the
directors contended that Canese’s statements defamed CONEMPA and thereby
Id. at ¶ 69.7.
Id.
113 A new Paraguayan criminal code took effect Nov. 26, 1998, and modified the
definition of defamation and reduced the associated penalties. See id. at ¶ 69.30. The current
version of the Paraguayan criminal code punishes as defamation any statement to a third person
that another person has committed an act when such statement is capable of damaging the other
person’s reputation. Código penal de la República del Paraguay: Ley No. 1160 (1997), Capítulo
VII, Artículo 151.
114 The Paraguayan criminal law punishes as insult a statement of negative opinion or
judgment about another person. See Código penal de la República del Paraguay: Ley No. 1160
(1997), Capítulo VII, Artículo 152.
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personally injured the reputations of its directors. Canese was convicted of
defamation and insult by a judge in a criminal trial court in 1994. He was
sentenced to four months imprisonment and a small fine.115 Canese also was
adjudged civilly liable for defamation. An appellate court subsequently reduced
the criminal sentence to two months’ imprisonment.116
As a result of his conviction and various associated judicial orders, Canese
was prevented from leaving Paraguay from 1994 to 1997.117 Subsequently, he
was prevented on several additional occasions from leaving the country. After a
new president succeeded Wasmosy, Canese was named Paraguayan vice
minister of mines and energy, but he still could not leave Paraguay without filing
a writ of habeas corpus each time.118
Approximately six years after his conviction, Canese successfully
appealed to the Supreme Court of Paraguay. In 2002, that court voided Canese’s
criminal conviction and sentence, absolving Canese of any responsibility or
penalty associated with his statements and expunging the government’s records
of the investigation of his case.119 Later, the Paraguayan Court took the
remarkable step of imposing all costs associated with the prosecution on the
original complainants, the three CONEMPA directors.120 Despite this judicial
action vacating the conviction and clearing Canese of any wrongdoing, the InterCanese v. Paraguay, at ¶ 69.15.
Id. at ¶ 69.20.
117 Id. at ¶ 60.a.
118 Id.
119 Id. at ¶ 69.49.
120 Id. at ¶ 69.50.
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American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights continued to entertain the case brought by Canese alleging that
his human rights were violated.121
In its 2004 decision, the Inter-American Court relied heavily on the
precedent it had set just two months earlier in Herrera v. Costa Rica. The court
stated that, as in Herrera v. Costa Rica, the press in Canese v. Paraguay played an
important role in enabling democracy; the court considered it particularly
important that Canese’s statements about Wasmosy had come during a political
campaign.122 Similar to Herrera, the court in Canese emphasized the importance
of the right to receive information, the role of free expression in democracy to
ensure government accountability and citizen participation, and the value of free
speech to promote tolerance and to facilitate the search for truth in the
marketplace of ideas.123
The court concluded that Canese exercised his protected right of
expression about a public figure and with respect to issues of public concern. 124
The court repeated its statement from Herrera that public officials are subject to
intense public scrutiny, and it added the gloss that “in the context of the public
debate, the margin of acceptance and tolerance of criticism by the State itself, and
by public officials, politicians and even individuals who carry out activities
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subject to public scrutiny, must be much greater than that of individuals.”125
Despite the Paraguayan Supreme Court’s vacation of Canese’s conviction, the
Inter-American Court held that Paraguay violated Canese’s human rights under
Article 13 of the American Convention by undertaking a criminal prosecution
that lasted approximately a decade and that resulted in his being unable to leave
the country for long periods of time.126 As in Herrera, though, the court in Canese
did not explicitly adopt an actual malice standard.

Aftermath of Herrera and Canese Cases
In light of the Inter-American Court’s failure to explicitly adopt the actual
malice standard in the Herrera and Canese cases, some OAS member nations
argued that Article 13 of the American Convention did not require a defamation
plaintiff to prove actual malice. For example, Jamaica argued before the InterAmerican Commission in 2008 that it could not be held responsible for failing to
require a civil plaintiff to prove that a newspaper and its journalists acted with
actual malice in republishing an Associated Press report alleged to be
defamatory.127 The Associated Press reported in 1987 that U.S. authorities were
investigating allegations that American firms paid kickbacks to Jamaican
government officials, including then-Minister of Tourism Eric Abrahams.128 The
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Associated Press report was picked up by the three largest newspapers in
Jamaica, the Daily Gleaner, the Sunday Gleaner and the Star, all of which were
owned by the Gleaner Company and overseen by Editor-in-Chief Dudley
Stokes.129
Abrahams sued the Gleaner Company and Stokes, and he succeeded in
Jamaican courts to achieve a default judgment of defamation liability, even
though the newspapers had “published an apology indicating that, at the time
they published the allegedly libelous information, they honestly believed it to be
true and accurate.”130 Nonetheless the Jamaican Supreme Court awarded
Abrahams compensatory damages of $80.7 million (Jamaican), though the award
was later reduced to $35 million (Jamaican). Stokes and the newspapers argued
that the damage award was disproportionate and that the American
Convention’s Article 13 was violated when the Jamaican courts imposed
defamation liability and damages on behalf of a public official without requiring
proof of actual malice. Jamaica responded that “the ‘actual malice’ standard is
not incorporated into Article 13 of the American Convention and therefore is not
binding on Jamaica.”131
Ultimately the Inter-American Commission did not pass judgment on the
actual malice issue because it said its scope of adjudication was confined to
determining whether damages were out of proportion. On that question, the
Id. at ¶ 17.
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commission acknowledged that the damage award was very large but concluded
that it did not violate the rights spelled out in the convention. The Jamaica case
pointed out the need for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to clarify
whether actual malice was a requirement for defamation liability under the
American Convention.

ACTUAL MALICE IN DEED, NOT IN NAME
Four years after addressing the issue in Herrera and Canese, the InterAmerican Court in 2008 again considered the proper legal standard for a nation
to impose criminal liability for defamation. The court continued to move
cautiously but, by 2009 the court had essentially applied the actual malice
standard. Yet the court refrained from citing Sullivan or explicitly adopting the
American version of the actual malice doctrine.

Kimel Case
Eduardo Kimel was an Argentine journalist who published a book called
La Masacre de San Patricio about the murder of five priests during Argentina’s
military dictatorship in 1976.132 In the book, Kimel wrote that the federal judge
who examined evidence in the case went through the motions of an investigation
but allowed the investigation to stall after evidence suggested the order for the
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Kimel v. Argentina, 2008 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 177, at ¶ 41 (May 2, 2008).

murders was given by the country’s military leaders.133 The judge in the case
brought a criminal defamation charge against Kimel, and he was ultimately
found guilty, fined and sentenced to serve one year in jail.134
The case was brought to the Inter-American Commission based on the
argument that Argentina had violated Kimel’s Article 13 right to freedom of
expression, and the commission found sufficient merit in the argument to refer
the case to the Inter-American Court. Prior to the court entering a judgment,
however, the commission, Kimel and Argentina engaged in negotiations that
resulted in Argentina admitting that it violated Article 13.135 But the question of
what would constitute sufficient reparation from Argentina to Kimel remained
unresolved and that matter went before the Inter-American Court for decision.
In the course of deciding that question in 2008, the court issued an opinion that
touched on the standard for defamation liability.
Within the context of the test it had applied in Herrera and Canese in 2004,
the Inter-American Court in Kimel stated that criminal defamation was not
categorically unnecessary and therefore in violation of the convention.136
However, according to the English version of the court’s opinion, a nation’s
judiciary must “carefully analyze[]” whether imposition of criminal defamation
is justified, “pondering the extreme seriousness of the conduct of the individual
who expressed his opinion, his actual malice, the characteristics of the unfair
Id. at ¶ 42.
Id. at ¶¶ 43-50.
135 Id. at ¶ 18.
136 Id. at ¶¶ 77-78.
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damage caused, and other information which shows the absolute necessity to
resort to criminal proceedings as an exception.”137 However, the Spanishlanguage version of the opinion does not use in this passage the term real malicia,
the most commonly accepted rendering in Spanish of “actual malice,” but rather
uses the word dolo, most commonly translated as “intent.”138 There is no
indication why the Spanish-language version of the opinion would use “intent”
while the English-language version would use “actual malice” to define the
requisite degree of fault.
Further, the court re-emphasized that the burden of proving the nature of
the speaker’s conduct rested with the plaintiff. The court also stressed that while
competing rights might be “apparently contradictory,” the freedom of speech
should not be undermined because it is “a milestone of democracy.”139 As with
Herrera and Canese, the court emphasized the role of free speech in ensuring
government accountability140 and also discussed the right to receive
information141 and the marketplace of ideas.142
Notwithstanding this speech-protective language, the court also said that
“journalists have the duty to verify reasonably, though not necessarily in an
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exhaustive manner, the truthfulness of the facts supporting their opinion.”143
Because of that, the court held, “[I]t is valid to claim equity and diligence in the
search for information and the verification of the sources. This implies the right
not to receive a manipulated version of the facts.”144 The court did not elaborate
further on this cryptic and seemingly unnecessary commentary. It could be seen
as granting a right in the defamation plaintiff to sue for “manipulated” facts, and
to place a burden on the defendant to show “equity and diligence.”
However, it could also be that the court simply meant to inch closer to the
actual malice standard without actually using that specific phrase. By saying
that journalists should be expected to reasonably but not exhaustively verify
facts, the court essentially acknowledged that a good faith effort at the truth —
one made without actual knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth —
was legally sufficient to avoid defamation liability and preserve the freedom of
speech. So the court could be understood to suggest here that journalists and
other speakers who are equitable, diligent and non-manipulative of facts will
exercise good faith and will not be guilty of actual malice. In that sense, then, the
court’s commentary could merely confirm that the inter-American human rights
system, like the U.S. Supreme Court, now recognizes that not only must
defamation plaintiffs prove the comments at issue were false but also that — at
least in the case of public officials and public figures speaking on matters of
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public concern — the speaker knew they were false or recklessly disregarded
their truth or falsity.
Yet it is clear that, in Kimel, the Inter-American Court determined that it
did not have to decide whether to apply the actual malice standard because
Kimel’s allegedly defamatory statements about the judge’s performance were
opinions or value judgments not capable of objective verification and, therefore,
not capable of defamation.145 As for damages, the court ordered Argentina to
pay Kimel a total of $30,000 (US) and to expunge the conviction and its effects
from Kimel’s records within six months. The court also ordered Argentina to
adapt its domestic law to the requirements of Article 13 and the rest of the
American Convention.146

Donoso Case
In the context of an intense 1999 national debate about the powers of
Panamanian Attorney General José Antonio Sossa to authorize wiretapping and
secret recording of telephone conversations, a lawyer named Tristán Donoso
called a press conference to allege that the attorney general signed off on secretly
tape recording Donoso speaking with a client who was under criminal
investigation.147 Donoso further alleged that the attorney general used the tape
to make an allegation to leaders of the National Bar Association that Donoso was
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part of an illegal conspiracy.148 The next day, the attorney general lodged a
criminal defamation complaint against Donoso for allegedly accusing the
attorney general falsely of committing the crime of illegal wiretapping and
recording telephone conversations. Donoso ultimately was convicted of criminal
defamation and was fined and sentenced to imprisonment for eighteen
months.149 The court that convicted Donoso specifically found that he “was not
certain” about the truth of the statements he made about Sossa during the press
conference.150
In its decision in 2009, the Inter-American Court found that Panama had
violated Donoso’s rights under Article 13 by convicting him of criminal
defamation. As in previous cases, the court first explained the importance of the
right to receive information and the value of free speech for self-governance and
government accountability.151 Then the court stated that Sossa was a public
official and the matter of his powers to wiretap and record telephone
conversations was a matter of public concern.152 The court concluded that
Donoso had made a true statement that Sossa disclosed the contents of a private
telephone conversation to third parties, and Donoso had made a false statement
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that Sossa had illegally ordered the wiretapping and recording in the first
place.153
However, the Inter-American Court held, various pieces of evidence
indicated that Donoso did not know the statement was false at the time he made
it during the press conference. For example, at the time of Donoso’s comments,
the attorney general was the only person legally authorized to order
wiretapping; the attorney general had the tape in his possession; someone in the
attorney general’s office had forwarded a copy of the recorded conversation to
the Catholic Church; the recording was played at the attorney general’s office to
leaders of the National Bar Association; and the attorney general did not respond
to a letter from Donoso asking him for a meeting to talk about the recording.154
As with the Kimel opinion, the English-language version of the Donoso
opinion uses the phrase “actual malice” when describing the analysis a national
court should engage in during a defamation case brought by a public official.155
But as with Kimel, the Spanish-language version of Donoso does not use real
malicia but instead refers merely to dolo, or “intent.” Hence, it appears the court’s
objective, given that the Spanish-language version was authored first by the
court and then later translated by staff to English, was to apply the actual malice
standard without actually using that phrase. Unlike Kimel, in which the court
ultimately determined the degree of fault in erroneous statement was irrelevant
Id. at ¶ 124.
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since the statements were subjective opinions rather than objective facts, the
court in Donoso concluded that Donoso’s level of knowledge of the truth of his
statements mattered since his statements were of a factual, or verifiable, nature.
It is clear the Donoso court purposely chose to use dolo rather than real
malicia in the key passage because, at another point in the opinion, the court did
use real malicia in describing the arguments by one of the attorneys.156 So the
court knew how to use real malicia when it wanted to, but chose in the key
holding to use dolo instead. This would seem to indicate the court’s reluctance in
actually committing to the phrase “actual malice,” even though the court seemed
perfectly comfortable applying the legal concept of actual malice.
Even before the court reached its conclusion that Donoso’s Article 13
rights were violated, Panama eliminated criminal libel liability for statements
about certain public officials.157

Aftermath of Kimel and Donoso Cases
Following the Inter-American Court’s use of the actual malice standard in
Kimel, the Special Rapporteur immediately began using the new requirement in
its communications about various criminal defamation cases. Relying on Kimel,
the Special Rapporteur reprimanded Ecuador and its president, Rafael Correa,
for desacato and criminal defamation cases brought against Ecuadoran
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journalists.158 In one case, Correa filed a desacato charge against La Hora
newspaper for an editorial criticizing his administration, and in another case the
journalist Nelson Fueltala was sentenced to sixty days of prison time for criminal
defamation after criticizing a provincial government official.159 The Special
Rapporteur reminded Correa and Ecuador “that public figures who consider that
a journalist has caused intentional harm to their honor, with actual malice,
should seek civil recourse.”160
Following Kimel and Donoso, there was some evidence the actual malice
requirement was taking deeper root throughout the region. In 2011, the Special
Rapporteur congratulated Argentina and Uruguay for incorporating the actual
malice standard into legislative enactments and judicial opinions.161 In 2010, the
Argentina Supreme Court had held in a civil defamation case brought against the
newspaper El Diario La Mañana that

With regard to information referring to public figures, when the news
item contains false or inaccurate expressions, those who consider
themselves affected must demonstrate that those who made said
expression or accusation knew the news item was false and acted with the
Organization of the American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights 2007 (Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression), 2008
IACHR 4 (Mar. 8, 2008).
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knowledge that it was false or with evident recklessness with regard to its
veracity.162

Still, notwithstanding progress, the inclinations to punish journalists
remain strong in some quarters. A Uruguayan prosecutor sought to jail
journalist Álvaro Alfonso for the crime of defamation based on publication of his
book Secrets of the Communist Party.163 The prosecutor argued that Alfonso acted
with actual malice in writing that a Communist former Uruguayan legislator
collaborated with the country’s military dictatorship from 1973 to 1985 by
identifying his Communist comrades.164 In other places, progress remains slow.
The Special Rapporteur noted in 2011 that Costa Rica’s Legislative Assembly had
once again tabled a bill that has been pending for more than a decade to reform
the country’s criminal code to incorporate an actual malice standard for criminal
defamation.165

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The results of all four Inter-American Court cases discussed in this article
favored freedom of expression over reputation. The four opinions share some
similarities and important differences. In all four cases, the Inter-American
Id. at ¶ 9.
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Court of Human Rights explained the rationales behind freedom of expression,
including self-governance, accountability and enabling the search for truth in the
marketplace of ideas. These same concepts were discussed in the Brennan
majority opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan. The Inter-American Court,
however, also repeatedly emphasized the importance of the right to receive
information, a concept to which the U.S. Supreme Court has given some
credence but has not fully explored or enthusiastically embraced.166
The Inter-American Court repeatedly emphasized across these four
opinions that it does not view criminal defamation as antithetical to Article 13 of
the American Convention, as long as the balance takes into account the
importance of free expression. Still, the court determined that all four
applications of criminal libel to speech violated Article 13 in these cases. The
court looked favorably on Panama’s decision to do away with criminal libel.
Although free speech advocates might disagree with the Inter-American Court’s
assessment that criminal libel and freedom of expression can coexist in a single
society, the reality is that various American states have been living with a similar
balance for decades.167
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Analysis of the four opinions also reveals some unanswered questions.
For example, when criminal and civil liability were both sought for a single
alleged defamation, the Inter-American Court tended to focus on the criminal
proceedings without specifying under what conditions an actual malice standard
is mandated for civil defamation lawsuits. Both the Inter-American Commission
and the Special Rapporteur have argued vigorously in favor of an actual malice
requirement in Article 13, but the Inter-American Court has been more cautious.
In fact, the court arguably has not yet explicitly adopted the phrase “actual
malice” even though the court has essentially applied the concept in Donoso. It
remains a mystery why the court has not adopted real malicia in its Spanishlanguage opinions, preferring instead dolo, or intent, while the English-language
versions of both Kimel and Donoso did state that actual malice was a requirement
of the American Convention. The origin and significance of this discrepancy are
unclear.
Scholars have noted that citation to foreign law may seem undemocratic
and illegitimate.168 Other scholars, meanwhile, advocate that the U.S. Supreme
Court should proactively seek to spread its influence on free speech matters
throughout the world.169 It could be argued that foreign courts’ reluctance to
adopt actual malice as a requirement in defamation actions brought by public
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officials is a demonstration of lack of commitment to free expression values and
principles. However, it might be the case instead that the reluctance is due to a
desire to maintain national sovereignty and credibility rather than seeming
overly influenced by the United States.170 The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, for example, in the four cases discussed here has assiduously avoided
using the phrase “actual malice” or citing the Sullivan opinion even while
progressively moving to, in essence, adopt that standard.
The court’s failure to spell out clearly its adoption of actual malice could
be seen as negative. The court’s delicate tap dance may have resulted in some
confusion. As has been discussed, some courts and legislators in OAS member
states seem to be unclear on whether the American Convention requires proof of
knowledge of falsity or recklessness, or whether proof of lack of good faith or
mere negligence would suffice. In addition, there has been some confusion
whether the burden of proof could be properly placed on a defamation plaintiff
to prove truth if he can; journalists, in particular, have sometimes been targeted
for defamation and required to prove the truthful basis for their statements.
However, it may actually be advantageous for the Inter-American Court
not to explicitly incorporate the phrase “actual malice” or cite to the Sullivan
opinion. Not citing Sullivan will allow the court to avoid the problem of
democratic illegitimacy in the eyes of some, achieving instead what one scholar
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has called “indigeneity.”171 Even while adroitly avoiding this problem, the court
has essentially achieved the effect of the actual malice standard. In Donoso, in
particular, the court reviewed the factual basis for Donoso’s statements about the
Panamanian Attorney General and concluded that Donoso did not speak with
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. U.S. scholars who have
concerns about the Inter-American Court’s failure to explicitly adopt actual
malice by use of that term would do well to remember that U.S. judges often
order jury instructions to exclude the confusing term “actual malice,”172 and
Justice Brennan himself, who popularized the term in Sullivan, later regretted its
use because of the confusion and misunderstandings it can cause.173 By citing to
Herrera and Canese rather than to Sullivan, the Inter-American Court in Kimel and
especially Donoso has made a version of the actual malice rule its own rather than
relying wholly on an American import.174
In the context of international human rights courts, the fundamental
concern of courts everywhere — potential lack of enforcement tools and the need
to maintain legitimacy through credibility — is enhanced.175 Judges on
international rights tribunals, then, must be particularly strategic when choosing
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which national authorities to cite.176 An empirical review of worldwide
constitutions and judicial decisions concluded that the influence of U.S.
constitutional principles is waning, but that no competitor is taking its place; in
other words, “[T]he notion that a particular constitution can serve as a dominant
model for other countries may itself be obsolete.”177 One scholar concluded that
the Inter-American Court frequently cites authorities from the European Court of
Human Rights,178 and this type of horizontal transjudicial communication might
simply be more natural than the odd mix of not-quite-horizontal and not-quitevertical transjudicial communication between the Inter-American Court and the
U.S. Supreme Court.179
The reaction to the Kimel and Donoso cases has yet to be fully realized, but
there are at least two reasons to believe the decisions could have long-lasting and
widespread impact. First, the cases, especially Donoso, largely have moved
beyond the misunderstandings of the actual malice doctrine that were present in
earlier Inter-American Court opinions. This clarity — at least as much as can be
achieved with the notoriously difficult definition of actual malice — should assist
OAS member nations in their considerations of whether to adopt the concept,
even if not the name. In Donoso, the Court clearly articulated and applied the
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actual malice standard to protect a journalist from criminal and civil liability
after he, in good faith, accused the Panamanian Attorney General of ordering
illegal wiretaps.
But the language of the opinion goes even further and begins to lay the
groundwork for application of the actual malice rule to public figures as well as
public officials. The Inter-American Court concluded that, among the reasons for
imposing an actual malice rule, a significant factor was that the attorney general
in question and other public officials “voluntarily expose themselves to control
by society, which results in a great risk of having their honor affected.”180
Further, the court said, public officials such as Sossa have “great social influence
and easy access to the media to provide explanations or to account for any events
in which they take part.”181 These same factors apply to public figures and are
among the reasons the U.S. Supreme Court has cited for extending actual malice
to defamation claims by public figures.182
The Inter-American Court’s exposition of the rationale behind the actual
malice rule — that individuals in prominent positions in democratic societies
have opened themselves up to criticism and have remedies to address it — is
reason for optimism that the actual malice rule might grab hold in the OAS
member states. In some of the nations that have declined to adopt actual malice,
jurists seem to have categorized the rule as an American phenomenon with no
Donoso v. Panama, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 193, at ¶ 122 (Jan. 27, 2009).
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application to their own situations.183 But the Inter-American Court has grasped
that the actual malice rule is a progressive approach to ensuring vigorous public
discussion of public affairs. The Donoso case represents the first time the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights has so completely applied the rule at the heart
of the actual malice formulation, and the court’s understanding of that rule
would seem to promise hope for greater acceptance and use throughout the
Americas.
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